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Why should American law supplant, for example, Canada’s or Great Britain’s or 
Japan’s own determination about how best to protect Canadian or British or Japanese 
customers from anti-competitive conduct engaged in significant part by Canadian or 
British or Japanese or other foreign companies?1 
Thus asked Justice Breyer in his 2004 opinion in F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. 
v. Empagran, SA,2 a case brought in U.S. federal court as a class action on behalf
of purchasers of certain vitamin products on foreign (non-U.S.) markets against
members of a cartel. The question was, of course, rhetorical. There seems to be,
at least prima facie, no good reason to impose U.S. antitrust law on other highly
developed countries with their own functioning antitrust regimes, especially
without or even against these countries’ will.3
But the question was also strangely misplaced. Although Canada, Great 
Britain, and Japan—the countries Breyer named—had urged the Court to 
dismiss the claims by foreign plaintiffs,4 the countries from which the named 
plaintiffs stemmed—Ecuador, Panama, and Ukraine—had remained silent.5 
These last three countries are representatives of less developed countries, many 
of which do not have very effective antitrust regimes.6 
Copyright © 2016 by Ralf Michaels. 
This article is also available online at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/. 
* Arthur Larson Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. Thanks for valuable suggestions
are due to Hannah Buxbaum and three anonymous reviewers. Special thanks for detailed feedback to 
Tim Büthe and Umut Aydin. 
1. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004).
2.  Id.
3.  But see infra Part IV.A.
4.  In Empagran, several foreign governments, had submitted amicus curiae briefs arguing against
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law to markets outside of the United States. 
5.  Empagran, 542 U.S. at 159–60. One named plaintiff came from Australia. He withdrew when
faced with the possibility of suing in Australia. See Bray v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd (2002) 118 FCR 1, 
aff’d, (2003) 130 FCR 317 (Austl.).  
6. Differences exist between the three countries. Ecuador established an antitrust regime only
recently. See, e.g., Luis Marín-Tobar, Competition Regulation in Ecuador, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 
755, 756 (2013) (outlining Ecuador’s introduction of a domestic anti-competition law in 2011); Luis 
Marín-Tobar, Lessons from the First Year of Competition Law in Ecuador, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 
(2014), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Uploads/Marin-TobarFEB-142.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9436-BXXG] (detailing Ecuador’s initial experiences as an enforcer of anti-competition 
law). For Panama, see, e.g., Claudia Schatan, The Dynamics of Competition Policies in Small Developing 
Economies: The Central American Countries’ Experience, in NEW COMPETITION JURISDICTIONS: 
SHAPING POLICIES AND BUILDING INSTITUTIONS 91, 92 (Richard Whish & Christopher Townley eds., 
2012) (explaining how the antitrust regimes of Central American countries suffer from limited 
competition culture, concentrated markets, limited official independence, scarce resources, and ill-fitting 
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With this in mind, Breyer’s question would better have read something like 
this: Why should American law supplant, for example, Ecuador, Panama, or 
Ukraine’s antitrust regimes, insofar as these countries are unable to protect their 
customers from anti-competitive conduct engaged in significant part by foreign 
companies? 
This question is harder to dismiss. Arguably, supplanting these countries’ 
ineffective competition regimes would serve a purpose. The question would not 
be one of superseding foreign regimes when there are none. The question would 
be one of filling regulatory gaps. Vis-à-vis countries with functioning antitrust 
regimes, the question is which of several countries should regulate the cartel. Vis-
à-vis countries without functioning antitrust regimes, the question is whether the 
cartel is regulated at all. If the developed country does not regulate, no other 
country does. Hence, the issue is not whether to defer to a foreign antitrust 
agency. Instead, the question is whether to defer to the cartel’s impunity. This 
policy decision would require quite a different justification. 
Developing countries would likely do better if they had effective antitrust 
regimes, and other articles in this issue discuss what is required for success. But 
we also need solutions for situations in which developing countries do not (yet) 
have such regimes, or in which they are for other reasons incapable of dealing 
with an international cartel. This is the situation this article addresses. It develops 
an argument for when and why a developed country’s antitrust regime should 
supplant the regime of a developing country. The question is, essentially, when 
and why the developed country should take over, in part, regulation of the 
developing country’s market. 
Some limitations should be mentioned. First, the article focuses on the 
regulation of cartels. Although supplanting antitrust law might well work also for 
other issues—for example, merger control or abuse of a dominant position—
these issues would require different considerations, which the article does not 
address. Second, for purposes of the article, a developed country is defined as a 
country with, and a developing country as a country without, a functioning 
antitrust regime. The analysis is therefore not directly applicable to developing 
countries that have effective regimes. By contrast, some of the arguments may be 
applicable to small developed countries with limited resources.7 
Part II begins by laying out the tension between the need for antitrust in 
developing countries and the obstacles these countries face in building their own 
regimes. It then argues for the possibility of one country’s antitrust institutions 
 
policy models). Ukraine, at the time, was thought to have a functioning antitrust regime, which later 
turned out to suffer from corruption; subsequent political development created problems for antitrust 
enforcement. See Riccardo Croce & Hanna Stakheyeva, Competition Law and State Aid Reform in Light 
of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Its Impact on Business in Ukraine, 35 EUR. COMPETITION 
L. REV. 23 (2014) (outlining Ukraine’s recent entrance into an Association Agreement with the 
European Union in order to mimic its antitrust law); Mark Briggs, Ukraine Updates Its Competition Laws, 
GLOB. COMPETITION REV. (Jan. 29, 2016), (detailing the legal consequences of Ukraine’s new 
arrangement with the European Union).  
 7.  See MICHAL S. GAL, COMPETITION POLICY FOR SMALL MARKET ECONOMIES (2003). 
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regulating another country’s market, as long as a jurisdictional basis exists. Part 
III discusses this idea of supplanting antitrust, its legal background, and the 
factors relevant for its justifiability. Part IV applies the idea of supplanting 
antitrust in three constellations: multinational cartels that affect markets in both 
developed and developing countries; transnational cartels in which cartels from 
developed countries target markets in developing countries; and domestic cartels 
that remain confined within the boundaries of the developing country. Part V 
discusses a number of possible objections. 
II 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND ANTITRUST REGULATION 
A. Challenges 
Once, establishing antitrust regimes was thought not to benefit developing 
countries.8 That view is no longer prevalent. Today, more than half of the 
developing countries in the world have antitrust regimes.9 
Having laws on the books represents, however, only a first step. A greater 
problem for many developing countries lies in building institutions10 and 
enforcing existing antitrust laws. Here, the data are somewhat unclear. 
Levenstein and Suslow found in 2004 that actual enforcement of existing antitrust 
law was widely lacking.11 Waked, by contrast, suggests that developing countries 
do allocate resources to the enforcement of antitrust laws, though the degree 
depends on, amongst others, general macroeconomic development, openness to 
trade and imports, and level of corruption.12 Büthe and Aydin identify several 
factors that constrain developing countries: limits in financial resources and 
expertise, unsupportive or hostile political–legal  environments, limitations to 
legal culture, a lack of competition culture, and underdeveloped markets13 
The enforcement problem is exacerbated for transboundary cartels with 
actors from outside the developing countries targeting the country’s markets.14 
 
 8.  For discussion of a list of remaining objections to antitrust regimes in developing countries, see 
Dina I. Waked, Adoption of Antitrust Laws in Developing Countries: Reasons and Challenges, 12 J.L. 
ECON. & POL’Y 193, 207–17 (2016). 
 9.  See id. at 195–96. 
 10.  William E. Kovacic & Marianela Lopez-Galdos, Lifecycles of Competition Systems: Explaining 
Variation in the Implementation of New Regimes, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016 at 89. 
 11.  Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Contemporary International Cartels and Developing 
Countries: Economic Effects and Implications for Competition Policy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 801, 845 (2004). 
 12.  See Dina Waked, Do Developing Countries Enforce Their Antitrust Laws? A Statistical Study 
of Public Antitrust Enforcement in Developing Countries (Dec. 22, 2011); see also Dina Waked, 
Antitrust Enforcement in Developing Countries: Reasons for Enforcement & Non-Enforcement Using 
Resource-Based Evidence (July 12, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1638874 [https://perma.cc/2KGR-
AAEK] (examining the factors that impact developing countries’ enforcement of antitrust laws).  
 13.  Umut Aydin & Tim Büthe, Competition Law & Policy in Developing Countries: Explaining 
Variations in Outcomes; Exploring Possibilities and Limits, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016 at 
15–26. 
 14.  Developing countries are affected, to a significant degree, by transnational and multinational 
cartels. See Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 11, at 813 (estimating, while admitting limitations to their 
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Often, less developed countries do not even appear to recognize the impact these 
cartels have on their economies.15 If cartel members act outside the country, 
agencies have difficulties detecting and scrutinizing the cartel.16 Where they do, 
the global market power of firms is often badly matched by the antitrust regimes 
of developing countries.17 Even if developing countries have the resources and 
expertise to regulate small and midsize local cartels, they may well be unable to 
regulate bigger and transnational or multinational cartels.18 It may often be 
preferable for them to allocate scarce resources to the regulation of domestic 
cartels. 
B. Disentangling Regulation And Regulator 
The result of the previous section is ambivalent. On the one hand, developing 
countries would benefit from antitrust regimes. On the other hand, some of these 
countries have difficulty building and using the necessary institutions, particularly 
ones strong enough to take on large, multinational cartels. 
The most obvious way to deal with these problems is for developing countries 
to build effective antitrust regimes. This is the focus of the other contributions in 
this issue. However, this does not resolve situations that occur while such 
institutions do not exist, and it does not resolve situations that are too big for 
developing countries to handle. Does that mean that, until and unless they find 
the resources to build such institutions, regulation of their markets will 
necessarily be deficient? This is so only if one assumes, like most do, that 
regulation has to happen in and by these countries themselves. 
But this assumption is not necessary. It merges two questions that are 
analytically separable. Even if one assumes that developing countries would 
benefit from antitrust regimes, this assumption does not reveal who should be 
charged with developing and enforcing antitrust law. One might think the answer 
obvious: the underdeveloped country itself. This would be plausible if markets 
 
data, that in one year (1997) “the total value of potentially ‘cartel-affected’ imports to developing 
countries was $51.1 billion”). For a more recent empirical study, see Marc Ivaldi, Frédéric Jenny & 
Aleksandra Khimich, Cartel Damages to the Economy: An Assessment for Developing Countries, in 
COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE BRICS AND IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 103 (Frédéric 
Jenny & Yannis Katsoulacos eds., 2016). 
 15.  See Alan Riley, Developing Ukrainian Competition Law: The International Price-Fixing Angle, 
UKR. J. BUS. L. (July 2010), http://www.ujbl.info/article.php?id=68 [https://perma.cc/98YW-8VD3], for a 
detailed example of how this plays out in Ukraine. 
 16.  See Marek Martyniszyn, Export Cartels: Is it Legal to Target Your Neighbour? Analysis in Light 
of Recent Case Law, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 181, 196 (2012) (examining the difficulties of enforcement when 
cartels are located abroad). 
 17.  Carlos Maria Correa, Competition Law and Development Policies, in TOWARDS WTO 
COMPETITION RULES 361, 382 (Roger Zäch ed. 1999). 
 18.  This is true even for developed, but small, economies. See, e.g., Michal S. Gal, Extraterritorial 
Application of Antitrust—The Case of a Small Economy: Israel, in COOPERATION, COMITY AND 
COMPETITION POLICY 97 (Andrew T. Guzman ed., 2011) (examining Israel’s enforcement difficulties as 
a small country in a global economy); Michal S. Gal, Antitrust in a Globalized Economy: The Unique 
Enforcement Challenges Faced by Small and Developing Jurisdictions, 33 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 1, 14–25 
(2009).  
MICHAELS  (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2016  1:03 PM 
No. 4 2016] SUPPLANTING FOREIGN ANTITRUST 227 
were completely national. In this case, only the affected state itself would be 
interested in regulation, and only that state would seem justified in making 
decisions.19 But markets transcend borders; global cartels are among the most 
forceful reminders of this. The same is true for laws; their impact is not strictly 
territorial and can cross borders.20 Consequently the market of one country could 
well be regulated by the antitrust regime of another. The question is not whether 
this is theoretically possible but rather under what conditions it is feasible, 
desirable, and legally permissible. 
Can the domestic authorities of a developed country fill the gap of regulation 
in a developing country? The idea of enforcing someone else’s antitrust regime 
is not as outlandish as it may seem.21 E.U. antitrust law is to a large part enforced 
not by E.U. agencies but by national institutions.22 Something similar is true for 
the Andean Community, which provides its General Secretariat with 
investigative powers but relies on domestic agencies for enforcement.23 The idea 
that transboundary cartels should be regulated by domestic agencies is therefore 
not per se anomalous. 
The question is whether such mechanisms can also operate between states. If 
the domestic agencies of a developing country cannot effectively regulate certain 
anti-competitive conduct, and no supranational institutions exist to fill the gap, a 
remaining possibility is what is here called “supplanting antitrust.” Concretely, 
the question is whether a developed economy can use its antitrust regime for the 
regulation of cartels that affect developing countries. And if so, what are the 
circumstances under which this would be justifiable? 
  
 
 19.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 20.  See Ralf Michaels, The State as a Transnational Legal Order, U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L., TRANSNAT’L 
& COMP. L. 1 (forthcoming 2016).  
 21.  See ELEANOR M. FOX, ANTITRUST WITHOUT BORDERS: FROM ROOTS TO CODES TO 
NETWORKS 4 (2015).  
 22.  See, e.g., ASSIMAKIS KOMMINOS, EC PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: DECENTRALISED 
APPLICATION OF EC COMPETITION LAW BY NATIONAL COURTS (2008). 
 23. La Comision de la Comunidad Andina [Andean Community Comm’n] 29 Mar. 2005, Dec. No. 
608, Normas para la proteccion y promocion de la libre competencia en la Comunidad Andina [Rules for 
the Protection and Promotion of Competition in the Andea Community], http://www.sice.oas.org/trade / 
junac/Decisiones/DEC608s.asp [https://perma.cc/L2P9-QCB3]; Luu Huong Ly, Regional Harmonization 
of Competition Law and Policy: An ASEAN Approach, 2 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 291, 307–08 (2012). 
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III 
SUPPLANTING ANTITRUST 
A. Assistance, Positive Comity, And Supplanting 
While actual supplanting antitrust as such appears like a novel idea,24 the use 
of developed country antitrust expertise and actors for developing countries is 
not unusual. Developed countries offer their regimes as models, and many 
antitrust regimes in developed countries around the world are the results of such 
modeling.25 They provide technical assistance in the form of expertise and 
manpower.26 They provide investigative assistance to concrete antitrust 
inquiries.27 And they provide enforcement assistance by enforcing decisions, 
especially court decisions, made in developing countries. 
Recently, Michal Gal has made a proposal that goes further.28 She suggests 
that small and developing countries could save on antitrust enforcement costs by 
recognizing decisions made in developed countries with regard to the same 
cartel.29 In her proposal, after a decision has been made in a developed country, 
a local plaintiff in the developing country need not prove existence of the cartel 
but only the local elements of the offense, as well as some procedural 
requirements concerning the recognized decision.30 
All these assistance mechanisms differ from supplanting in a crucial way: they 
leave implementation to the developing country. This is different from another 
form of assistance that is more akin to supplanting, namely positive comity.31 The 
OECD defines this as an instrument “whereby competition authorities can 
request another jurisdiction to address anti-competitive conduct that might best 
be fixed with an enforcement action in the country that is the recipient of that 
request.”32 Positive comity is regulated in several international agreements.33 It is 
 
 24.  But for an early proposal to use extraterritorial application of domestic antitrust law as an 
alternative to development aid, see Wolfgang Fikentscher, Third World Trade Partnership: Supranational 
Authority vs. National Extraterritorial Antitrust—A Plea for “Harmonized” Regionalism, 82 MICH. L. 
REV. 1489 (1984). 
 25.  For analysis, see Michal S. Gal, The ‘Cut and Paste’ of Article 82 of the EC Treaty in Israel: 
Conditions for a Successful Transplant, 9 EUR. J.L. REFORM 467 (2007). 
 26.  D. Daniel Sokol, The Future of International Antitrust and Improving Antitrust Agency Capacity, 
103 NW. U. L. REV. 1081, 1087–96 (2009); D. Daniel Sokol & Kyle W. Stiegert, Exporting Knowledge 
Through Technical Assistance and Capacity Building, 6 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 233 (2010). 
 27.  Marek Martyniszyn, Inter-Agency Evidence Sharing in Competition Law Enforcement, 19 INT’L 
J. EVID. & PROOF 11 (2015). 
 28.  Michal S. Gal, Free Movement of Judgments: Increasing Deterrence of International Cartels 
Through Jurisdictional Reliance, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 57 (2010). 
 29.  Id. at 59–60. 
 30.  Id. at 73–74. 
 31.  See COMMITTEE ON COMPETITION LAW & POLICY, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., 
REPORT ON POSITIVE COMITY (1999). 
 32.  ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 
IN COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT 11, 13 (2014). 
 33.  See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of Canada on the Application of Positive Comity Principles to the Enforcement of their 
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a version of supplanting in the sense that one country regulates the market of 
another. Here, the decision that enforcement should take place is still taken by 
the affected country (through a request), but an actual enforcement is left to the 
other country. 
Supplanting antitrust builds on these ideas but goes further. The idea is that 
a developed country’s antitrust agencies and courts assert jurisdiction over cartels 
that have some or even all of their effect in a less developed country, even in the 
absence of a treaty that allows for it, and even in the absence of a request by the 
developing country. 
B. Jurisdiction 
The question of who gets to regulate a market is not merely a matter of policy 
but also of law—both domestic and international.34 Under international law, 
states are limited in their ability to regulate events that take place outside their 
borders. What is required is a jurisdictional basis providing a genuine connection 
between the regulating state and the affected parties or the regulated 
transactions.35 What exactly constitutes such a genuine connection is contested, 
but a reasonable level of consensus exists, both generally and with specific 
reference to antitrust law. 
States are not required to go to the limits of what is allowed under 
international law; they can, and frequently do, establish further restrictions.36 On 
the other hand, because jurisdiction is an outflow of sovereignty, states can 
delegate the exercise of jurisdiction to other states. Such deferral of jurisdiction 
has taken place, for example, where countries have granted the International 
Criminal Court jurisdiction.37 It can also take place between states.38 For example, 
the 1972 European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal 
 
Competition Laws, Can.–U.S., art. IV, Oct. 5, 2004, T.I.A.S. No. 04-1005.1 (enhancing the process of 
referring anti-competitive activities to either U.S. or Canadian authorities); Agreement Between the 
Government of the United States of America and the European Communities on the Application of 
Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of their Competition Laws, EC–U.S., art. IV, June 4, 1998, 
T.I.A.S. No. 12958 (codifying positive comity between the United States and European Communities). 
 34.  See generally CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION OVER ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008) (examining the current domestic competition laws and how they interact 
with international law).  
 35.  Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 4 (Apr. 6); Barcelona Traction, Light 
and Power Company (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 70 (Feb. 5); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF 
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 211 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 
2016). 
 36.  RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 211, 
reporter’s note 1 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016) (citing Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 63, 76 (Feb. 14) (joint separate opinion by Higgins, Kooijmans, 
Buergenthal, JJ.)).  
 37.  See, e.g., Dapo Akande, The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of 
Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limits, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 618, 621–34 (2003) (discussing states deferring 
jurisdiction to the International Criminal Court). 
 38.  Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 44 (Winter 2001). 
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Matters allowed such transfer. 39 Importantly, such transfer can happen even 
without the consent of the country whose nationals are being subjected to the 
jurisdiction.40 This is sometimes called the “representation principle” of 
jurisdiction.41 
The most important traditional basis of jurisdiction is territorial jurisdiction.42 
States have jurisdiction to regulate conduct, including anti-competitive conduct, 
in their territory. This works well for domestic cartels, but less well for 
transboundary cartels, in particular cartels that target foreign states. In these 
cases, the state of the place of conduct has jurisdiction to regulate the respective 
conduct, but frequently has no interest in doing so, because the conduct has no 
impact on the state’s market. As a consequence, many states do not exercise this 
jurisdiction with regard to effects outside their boundaries, in particular through 
the so-called export cartel exemption.43 
In addition, states have jurisdiction over the conduct of their own nationals 
under the active personality principle.44 Under this principle, a state can regulate 
its own corporations when they are engaged in anti-competitive conduct. The 
basis is of limited importance in antitrust law, however, for two reasons. First, 
like with territorial jurisdiction, states often lack the interest in barring their own 
corporations from conduct that is beneficial to the corporation and not 
detrimental to their own markets. Second, international cartels often bring 
together corporations from different countries. Thus it would be unsatisfactory 
for a state to regulate only those members of the cartel that are its own nationals. 
The most important jurisdictional basis for antitrust violations has become 
the effects doctrine.45 Under this doctrine, a state has jurisdiction to regulate 
conduct that has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable detrimental 
effect on the state’s economy. Jurisdiction exists even where the regulated 
entities are not nationals of the regulating state, and where the relevant conduct 
(for example, the price-fixing agreement) takes place outside of that state. The 
doctrine, which was long contested, is now widely accepted.46 It is today the most 
 
 39.  European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, May 15, 1972, E.T.S. 
No. 073.  
 40.  For discussion see Michael P. Scharf, The ICC’s Jurisdiction over the Nationals of Non-Party 
States: A Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 113–15 (Winter 2001). 
 41.  COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 14 (1990); LUC 
REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 21–24 (2004). 
 42.  RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 211 
(AM. LAW INST., Council Draft Dec. 2015); CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 42 (2008).  
 43.  See infra Part IV.B. For U.S. law, see Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
6(a), 45(a)(3) (2012). 
 44.  RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 214 
(AM. LAW INST., Council Draft Dec. 2015); RYNGAERT, supra note 42, at 88–89. 
 45.  RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 213 
(AM. LAW INST., Council Draft Dec. 2015).  
 46.  See Ivo E. Schwartz & Jürgen Basedow, Restrictions on Competition, 3 INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 60, 67 (1995). 
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important basis of jurisdiction over anti-competitive conduct because it ensures 
that the country most affected by a cartel has jurisdiction to regulate that cartel. 
C. Applicable Law 
Jurisdiction to regulate is only one question. The other one, for current 
purposes, is what law applies. Traditionally, if a court asserts jurisdiction over 
claims from injuries suffered on foreign market, it will normally apply its own law 
to them. In the United States, this follows from the subject matter jurisdiction of 
federal courts, which is limited by the scope of application of federal law. In 
Europe, private plaintiffs can opt for applicability of the law of the court if more 
than one market is affected.47 
The application of the court’s own law can often be justified on the basis of 
the conflict-of-laws doctrine of interest analysis. Under interest analysis, a court 
will apply the law of a country that has an interest in the application of its law.48 
If laws conflict, a decision must be made, but often this is not necessary. If the 
policies of the court’s law and the foreign law coincide—as can be the case, for 
example, in the universally accepted ban on price-fixing—a court is entitled, 
under interest analysis, to apply its own law. In this case, called a false conflict, 
the foreign country’s interests are simultaneously furthered. Moreover, a country 
is arguably entitled to apply its own law to a situation with links to a foreign 
country even when it has no interest of its own, provided that the other country 
has no regulatory interest in regulation, either. In conflict of laws, this case is 
called an unprovided-for case, and it is generally dealt with by application of the 
forum’s law.49 The situation in which the less developed country has no 
functioning antitrust regime can be viewed as such a situation—the developing 
country has no law that it could want to be applied and therefore no interest in 
the sense of interest analysis. 
The application of just one law—the forum court’s law—to antitrust 
violations in foreign markets has advantages and disadvantages. The great 
advantage is simplicity: the court must apply only one law to the entire cartel, and 
that is the law the court knows best. The disadvantage is that the court’s own law 
may not be the most adequate law with regard to foreign markets. If developing 
countries have different antitrust laws, their interests would often be better 
served if those laws were applied rather than those of the developed country. 
The application of foreign antitrust law remains, however, a rarity. In 
antitrust cases, U.S. courts can assert so-called “supplementary jurisdiction” over 
claims governed by foreign law, though in practice they often seem unwilling to 
do so.50 In Europe, by contrast, the applicable law is normally the law of the 
 
 47.  Council Regulation 864/2007, art. 6(3)(b), 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40 (EC). 
 48.  For a very accessible introduction, see KERMIT ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF LAWS 43–80 (2d ed. 
2015). 
 49.  The classical case is Erwin v. Thomas, 506 P.2d 494 (Or. 1973). 
 50.  28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 
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affected market.51 There is no principle under international law, however, that 
suggests that courts should not be allowed to apply foreign antitrust law, and why 
agencies should not at least consider the content of foreign law. In other areas of 
the law, courts are used to the application of foreign law, which may be applicable 
under principles of choice of law. This should be possible and would actually be 
desirable for globalized markets.52 However, that argument cannot be fully 
developed here. 
D. Relevant Factors 
When would supplanting antitrust be desirable? While specifying a 
comprehensive set of the factors to determine whether supplanting is justifiable 
in a given case would be premature, it is helpful to list some of the factors that 
contribute the analysis. 
The first, and most important, factor is subsidiarity. Everything else being 
equal, it is preferable if a developing country regulates its own economy by itself, 
rather than for a developed country to do so in its stead. In this way, supplanting 
antitrust is normally justified only in cases in which the developing country is 
unable to effectively regulate a cartel on its own. This inability may rest on lack 
of resources or expertise in the developing country itself. It may also rest, 
however, on the insight that centralized regulation by the developed country 
would be more effective than decentralized regulation, a point that will be 
developed in part IV.53 
A second relevant factor is the size and complexity of the event and of the 
regulated actors relative to the capacities of the developed country’s agencies. In 
relatively small and simple cases, domestic agencies of underdeveloped countries 
can be effective. In more complex cases and cases involving strong corporate 
actors, such agencies may lack the required expertise and means. Here, 
supplanting antitrust can become attractive. 
A third factor is the degree of internationality of the cartel. This concerns 
both the extent to which the developing country itself is affected and the total 
degree of internationality. First, the case for supplanting antitrust is hardest to 
make where a cartel is purely local, confined to the developing country.54 The 
case is easiest where the cartel significantly affects the developed country itself. 
Second, the more countries that are involved, the more problematic it will be to 
have multiple proceedings, and the stronger the argument becomes for 
centralization of regulation in one country. These questions will be discussed in 
part IV. 
 
 51. See INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LITIGATION: CONFLICT OF LAWS AND COORDINATION 225, 
235 (Jürgen Basedow, Stéphanie Francq & Laurence Idot eds., 2012).  
 52.  See William S. Dodge, The Public-Private Distinction in the Conflict of Laws, 18 DUKE J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 371, 393 (2008). 
 53.  Infra Part IV.A. 
 54.  Whether conduct by developing country subsidiaries of OECD country–based multinational 
firms qualifies as transnational will depend on a case-by-case analysis. 
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A fourth important factor is the congruence of laws and policies. Simply 
speaking, supplanting seems much more legitimate where no conflict exists 
between the enforcing state’s laws and policies and those of the underdeveloped 
country. In some areas, policies are the same everywhere.55 Price fixing, for 
example, is universally abhorred. In other areas, however, some pertinent 
conflicts exist, and they matter. Where conflicts exist, supplanting antitrust 
appears problematic, unless the institutions of the developed country are willing 
to adopt the policies of the developing country by applying its law. An especially 
difficult case is the one in which the developing country has not actually 
developed its own independent laws and policies. In this case, supplanting 
antitrust can be justified insofar as the enforcing state is willing and able to 
develop policies that are—hypothetically, at least—catered to the needs of the 
underdeveloped country. 
Economists once assumed that a single optimal antitrust regime could be 
designed in the abstract and then implemented in different countries.56 In reality, 
the optimal antitrust regime for developing countries may be different from that 
of developed countries.57 First, countries have not just different cultures58 but also 
idiosyncratic policy preferences, so optimal regimes may differ between 




 55.  Gal, supra note 28, at 84–85. 
 56.  See, e.g., DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION: LAW, MARKETS, AND GLOBALIZATION 
82 (2010); David Lewis, Embedding a Competition Culture: Holy Grail or Attainable Objective?, in 
COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, 228, 228–30 (D. Daniel Sokol et al. eds. 2013). For an attempt 
at a model code, see Int’l Antitrust Code Working Grp., Draft International Antitrust Code as a GATT-
MTO-Plurilateral Trade Agreement, 5 WORLD TRADE & ARB. MATERIALS 126 (1993). 
 57.  Dina I. Waked, Development Studies Through the Lens of Critical Law and Economics: 
Efficiency and Redistribution Revisited in Market Structure Analyses in the South, 5 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL 
THEORY 649, 657 (2015). For a list of basic characteristics of developing jurisdictions, see Michal S. Gal 
& Eleanor M. Fox, Drafting Competition Law for Developing Jurisdictions: Learning from Experience, 
in THE ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING JURISDICTIONS: THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR 
COMPETITION LAW 296, 304–11 (Michal S. Gal et al eds., 2015); see also Tamar Indig & Michal S. Gal, 
Lifting the Veil: Rethinking the Classification of Developing Economies for Competition Law and Policy, 
in THE ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING JURISDICTIONS: THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR 
COMPETITION LAW 51, 52 (Michal S. Gal et al eds., 2015). 
 58.  See Indig & Gal, supra note 57, at 66–77; Wolfgang Pape, Socio-Cultural Differences and 
International Competition Law, 5 EUR. L.J. 438, 445 (1999) (presenting perceived cultural differences in 
competition law). 
 59.  See Eleanor M. Fox, Competition, Development and Regional Integration: In Search of a 
Competition Law Fit for Developing Countries, in COMPETITION POLICY AND REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 273 (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2012) (examining the different 
needs of developing countries in creating competition law); Dina I. Waked, Antitrust Goals in Developing 
Countries: Policy Alternatives and Normative Choices, 38 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 945 (2015); see also FOX, 
supra note 21, at 9–11 (discussing six possible models for developing countries, including, as the sixth 
option, a tailor-made regime); Heba Shahein, Designing Competition Laws in new Jurisdictions: Three 
Models to Follow, in NEW COMPETITION JURISDICTIONS, supra note 6, at 35, 63–65 (discussing the pros 
and cons of ‘tailor-made’ competition laws as opposed to a ‘cut and paste’ adoption of EU or U.S. law, a 
contextualized translation of these laws).  
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democracy, existing Western-based models that focus exclusively on economic 
efficiency may not be adequate.60 
Second, market conditions in developing countries differ in relevant ways. 
The policies of U.S. and E.U. antitrust law are formulated for countries with well-
functioning markets, little statism, minimal corruption, and significant resources. 
They arguably do not fit well in developing countries where these factors are 
absent,61 just as they would not have fit the OECD countries themselves at earlier 
stages of their development. Competition is often lagging, meaning that antitrust 
law must promote, not merely protect, competition.62 Moreover, developing 
countries may have strong and legitimate interests in helping their corporations 
become competitive before opening up their markets to foreign competitors that 
would immediately overrun the market.63 
Although it might be beneficial in theory for developing countries to develop 
their own idiosyncratic antitrust regimes, it seems unlikely that this will happen 
to a significant degree. This is so for at least four reasons.64 First, developing 
countries often do not even develop such preferences, for lack of democratic 
representation or for lack of economic expertise. Second, legal and economic 
advisers often bring with them their own preferences, even if they aspire not to. 
Third, countries have incentives to match their antitrust laws to a global 
consensus in order to assure investors. And fourth, when international financial 
institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank make 
loans conditional on the adoption of antitrust laws, there is significant pressure 
for these laws to comply with a U.S.–E.U. model.65 Therefore, even if an antitrust 
law is formally a sovereign legislative act of an underdeveloped country, 
substantively it often reflects global and foreign preferences more than domestic 
preferences. 
 
 60.  See Niels Petersen, Antitrust Law and the Promotion of Democracy and Economic Growth, 9 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 593, 594 (2013) (discussing the possibility that such models can have negative 
economic implications).  
 61.  See Simon J. Evenett, Competition Law and the Economic Characteristics of Developing 
Countries, in THE ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING JURISDICTIONS, supra note 57, at 15, 
19–29 for an explanation of these different conditions.  
 62.  See Oliver Budzinski & Maryam H.A. Beigi, Generating Instead of Protecting Competition, in 
THE ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING JURISDICTIONS, supra note 57, at 223 (arguing 
that competition policy in developing countries must work to generate competition).  
 63.  See Josef Drexl, Consumer Welfare and Consumer Harm: Adjusting Competition Law and 
Policies to the Needs of Developing Jurisdictions, in THE ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF 
DEVELOPING JURISDICTIONS: THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION LAW, supra note 57, at 265, 
292–93 (discussing the importance of first addressing monopolies within developing countries).  
 64.  For reasons for a “cut and paste” approach, see Gal & Fox, supra note 57, at 300–03. For more 
general advantages and limits of a one size fits all approach, see generally, Ralf Michaels, “One Size Can 
Fit All”—Some Heretical Thoughts on the Mass Production of Legal Transplants, in ORDER FROM 
TRANSFER: COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND LEGAL CULTURE 56 (Günter Frankenberg 
ed., 2013). 
 65.  Waked, supra note 89, at 200. 
MICHAELS  (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2016  1:03 PM 
No. 4 2016] SUPPLANTING FOREIGN ANTITRUST 235 
IV 
APPLICATION 
How would supplanting antitrust apply in practice? To answer this question, 
it helps to distinguish between three types of cartels: local, transnational, and 
multinational cartels. Local cartels are cartels that exist exclusively within one 
country and its market. Transnational cartels are cartels in which actors from one 
or more countries conspire in order to influence the market in another country 
or other countries. Export cartels are the main example of such cartels. 
Multinational cartels, finally, combine both actors from and markets in multiple 
countries, where there is overlap between countries of conduct and actors on the 
one hand and markets on the other. 
These are ideal types, and the boundaries are fuzzy. In particular, the 
distinction between transnational and multinational cartels may seem unusual, 
but because both raise different considerations the distinction is important for 
the assessment. The three types are addressed in reverse order, because the case 
for supplanting antitrust is made most easily for multinational cartels, and least 
easily for domestic cartels. 
A. Supplanting Antitrust In Multinational Cases 
In some ways, multinational cartels present the most interesting case. Should, 
the antitrust law and enforcement institutions of a developed country supplant 
those of other countries in multinational cartel cases? 
The developing country may have a genuine interest in such supplanting—
especially if the cartel is too powerful or too complex for the country’s own 
authorities. A further interest in such supplanting is shared by developed and 
developing countries alike: the global interest in centralized regulation of a 
cartel.66 When a cartel transcends boundaries, separate regulation within each 
affected market is inefficient because multiple agencies are required to engage in 
similar regulation. This duplicates regulation costs for agencies and raises costs 
for both plaintiffs and defendants in antitrust litigation.67 Moreover, without 
coordination, such parallel and duplicative regulation can, in theory, lead to 
either over- or under-regulation.68 In practice it will more likely lead to under-
regulation, because no state would go above what is necessary for its own market, 
but some may not find it worthwhile to regulate the cartel.69 Transgovernmental 
coordination of antitrust regulation, the main alternative to centralized 
 
 66.  OLIVER BUDZINSKI, THE GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL COMPETITION: COMPETENCE 
ALLOCATION IN INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY 47–49 (2008); see also Hannah L. Buxbaum & 
Ralf Michaels, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in International Antitrust Law—A US Perspective, in 
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST, supra note 51, at 235. 
 67.  The focus here is on cartels. It should be noted that, in mergers in particular, parallel 
enforcement raises costs and risks for corporations that have to get approval from multiple agencies. 
 68.  Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1501, 1512–21 
(1998). 
 69.  Cf. Gal, supra note 28, at 79; Andrew T. Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, 22 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 355, 362–63 (2004). 
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regulation, can lead to considerable costs, because agreements must be reached 
between different states. Thus, the most efficient way to regulate a multinational 
cartel is centralized regulation. 
If centralized regulation is attractive, the most attractive regulator would 
appear to be a supranational institution. Such an institution does not exist, 
however. Hopes for a world antitrust court, for example within the WTO, have 
not materialized. Regional courts like the courts of the European Union are of 
little help for cases outside or beyond Europe. Thus, in the absence of such an 
institution, the question remains whether centralization can take place through 
the institutions of one of the affected countries, in particular of a developed 
country. Central regulation of the entire cartel by one developed country could 
be viewed as a stark example of positive comity. 
Centralized enforcement by a developed country is not only based on a 
mutual interest, however. In addition, developed countries have a genuine 
interest in taking into account worldwide effects of a multinational cartel. As the 
U.S. Supreme Court argued in a somewhat different context “[P]ersons doing 
business both in this country and abroad might be tempted to enter into anti-
competitive conspiracies affecting American consumers in the expectation that 
the illegal profits they could safely extort abroad would offset any liability to 
plaintiffs at home.”70 
This can be demonstrated with a simple thought experiment. Imagine a cartel 
makes supra-competitive profits of $1 billion worldwide, of which $100 million is 
made in the United States. If a U.S. court assigns treble damages to the class of 
U.S. purchasers, the cartel faces costs of $300 million, which leaves it with an 
overall profit of $700 million. As a consequence, the threat of treble damages in 
the United States alone is not a sufficient deterrent for the cartel. Importantly, 
the cartel is not even deterred from fixing prices in the U.S. market. Allowing 
only purchasers from the U.S. market to sue for treble damages thus leads to 
under-regulation, even for the U.S. market.71 
Note that this assessment does not change when the cartel affects multiple 
countries with effective antitrust regimes. Even if multiple agencies around the 
world assess fines and damages with regard to the effect the cartel has on their 
 
 70.  Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 315 (1978); cf. Guzman, supra note 69, at 362–63. 
 71.  That this is no idle speculation becomes apparent from an argument made by plaintiffs in 
Empagran: 
Because the appellees’ product (vitamins) was fungible and globally marketed, they 
were able to sustain super-competitive prices abroad only by maintaining super-
competitive prices in the United States as well. Otherwise, overseas purchasers would 
have purchased bulk vitamins at lower prices either directly from U.S. sellers or from 
arbitrageurs selling vitamins imported from the United States, thereby preventing the 
appellees from selling abroad at the inflated prices. Thus, the super-competitive 
pricing in the United States “gives rise to” the foreign super-competitive prices from 
which the appellants claim injury. 
Empagran S.A. v F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Appellants’ Brief). Similarly, e.g., Christopher Sprigman, Fix Prices Globally, Get Sued Locally? 
U.S. Jurisdiction over International Cartels, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 265, 274–76 (2005). 
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markets, the cartel may remain under-regulated, because not all countries 
affected by the cartel will actually regulate. Imagine, in the hypothetical example 
above, that the global cartel makes sixty percent of its profits in developed 
countries and forty percent in developing countries without effective antitrust 
institutions. If, in this case, each of the countries that do regulate confined itself 
to the effect on its own market, the cartel would be regulated only with regard to 
sixty percent of its profits—it would, in other words, remain under-deterred. 
Such under-regulation is not required by the restrictions international law 
places on extraterritoriality: Where foreign corporations are injuring foreign 
purchasers in a foreign market, one could argue that the United States lacks a 
sufficient connection to take those foreign purchases into account. But this 
argument is erroneous. As long as the regulating country is affected, it has 
jurisdiction to regulate the cartel, even if some of the effects are felt elsewhere. 
International law does not require that such regulation must be confined to the 
effects within the regulating country. Although effects create the basis for 
jurisdiction, what is being regulated is the conduct. 
Indeed, the same result could be reached without direct regulation of foreign 
markets. Imagine the United States provided a remedy only to the U.S. 
purchasers, but that remedy was tenfold rather than threefold damages, because 
that was calculated as necessary to achieve deterrence. In this case, the cartel 
would be as effectively deterred as it would be by granting treble damages to 
foreign purchaser, but there would be no problem of extraterritoriality.72 If $1 
billion is the amount necessary to deter the cartel from fixing prices on a global 
market that includes the United States, then the United States can legitimately 
assess this amount in order to protect its interests. As a matter of fact, public 
authorities regularly assess their fines on the basis of the cartel members’ 
worldwide turnover.73 
Moreover, even in a situation with existing antitrust regulation in various 
countries, it would be in every country’s interest that the cartel be regulated also 
with regard to effects on those markets that have no effective enforcement 
regimes.74 If a supranational institution existed, it could appoint the country that 
should regulate the anti-competitive conduct.75 In the absence of such an 
institution, determining the appropriate regulator is harder but not impossible. 
Principles of positive comity, combined with conflict-of-laws rules, should make 
it possible for them to defer to the best-equipped country.76 This may often be 
the country in which most of the defendants are situated, or the country that was 
most affected by the cartel. 
 
 72.  Whether there would be a problem of constitutionality is a different matter. 
 73.  See INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK GRP., SETTING OF FINES FOR CARTELS IN ICN 
JURISDICTIONS 15–16 (2008), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/ 
doc351.pdf [https://perma.cc/655G-F5MT]. 
 74.  For a two-tier solution, see Sprigman, supra note 71, at 282–83.  
 75.  See BUDZINSKI, supra note 66, at 166–167, 203–06. 
 76.  See also FOX, supra note 21, at 2–3. 
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Regulation may thus be in the interest of the developed country. It is also in 
the interest of the developing country if enough of the previously discussed 
conditions are met. If a cartel affects a country without an effective antitrust 
regime, that country will, under most circumstances, benefit from effective 
regulation of the cartel, even if that regulation is performed by the institutions of 
a developed country. Under-regulation of the cartel would be worse for the 
developing country. These considerations are relevant under international law, 
too. Extraterritoriality is a problem for sovereignty: regulating events taking 
place in a foreign country threatens to impede that country’s sovereignty. If a 
developing country raises a protest—a diplomatic protest, an amicus curiae brief, 
or even an informal complaint—this is relevant under international law. Even if 
the developed country has jurisdiction, the protest, as an expression of strong 
countervailing foreign interests, may make its exercise unreasonable.77 If the 
country does not raise such a protest, however, this will often mean that it does 
not perceive regulation by the developed country as an intrusion into its 
sovereignty. An explicit request, as provided under positive comity, should not 
be required. 
B. Supplanting Antitrust In Transnational Cases 
Partly different considerations occur in transnational cartels, in which actors 
from one or more developed countries coordinate in order to affect the markets 
of one or more developing countries. 
Such cartels are normally best regulated by the affected country or countries 
themselves. These countries feel the effects of the cartel and, therefore, are best 
suited to determine the optimal reaction. However, when these countries do not 
have effective institutions, the question arises whether another country, in 
particular the country in which the cartel members are located or in which they 
act, can and should regulate the cartel.  Under international law, there is no doubt 
that the country can do so: Both the place of the conduct and the nationality and 
domicile of the actor provide a sufficient nexus for the establishment of 
jurisdiction.78 However, in antitrust law this jurisdiction is rarely exercised. Many 
countries exempt so-called export cartels from regulation, by law or at least in 
practice.79 
 
 77.  Reasonableness limitations on jurisdiction are state practice, even though it is doubtful whether 
they rise to the level of international law requirements. See RYNGAERT, supra note 42, at 178; see also 
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 204 (AM. LAW 
INST., Council Draft Dec. 2015) 
 78.  See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
212 (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft Dec. 2015) (“International law recognizes a state’s jurisdiction to 
prescribe law with respect to persons, property, and conduct within its territory”); id. § 214 
(“International law recognizes a state’s jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to the conduct, interests, 
status, and relations of its nationals outside its territory”). 
 79.  See the table of selected countries in Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Suslow, The Changing 
International Status of Export Cartel Exemptions, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 785, 819–820 (2005). See also 
Martyniszyn, supra note 16, at 186–88 (discussing arguments for and against the regulation of export 
cartels).  
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Exempting export cartels from regulation has been called “beggar-thy-
neighbor” conduct,80 but the exemption has a logic behind it that seems at first 
compelling.81 Exempting export cartels creates, effectively, exclusive regulatory 
jurisdiction in the market country.82 Normally, a good case can be made that the 
exporter’s country should not supplant the market country’s own policy 
determinations.83 If the market country allows a certain conduct, no sensible goal 
seems to be furthered if the exporter’s country nonetheless forbids its exporters 
from engaging in the conduct, thereby reducing their ability to compete with 
other companies that face no similar legal constraints. 
However, this logic only works where the market country has the capacity to 
regulate and where non-regulation is a deliberate policy choice. Where that is not 
the case, the logic breaks down, and the cartel remains unregulated: the target 
country cannot, and the country of origin will not regulate. This is a special 
problem for developing countries,84 and it has inspired protest among them 
against developed countries’ use of the exemption.85 
Is this result unavoidable without an international agreement abolishing the 
exemption and requiring the state in which the anti-competitive conduct occurs 
to regulate?86 Developing countries would benefit, but will developed countries 
have enough of an incentive? The first step in determining the answer is asking 
whether the exporter’s country really has no interest in regulating the export 
cartel. Abstractly, this seems plausible. A country typically has little interest in 
regulating conduct that has its effects elsewhere.87 If the goal of U.S. antitrust law 
is the protection of consumers, this is typically read to implicitly refer to U.S. 
consumers. Where resources are scarce, as they always are, priority will be given 
to domestic markets. In fact, countries will often even promote export control as 
a way of empowering their domestic corporations.88 
But this is a narrow definition of interests. States do regulate conduct that 
affects foreign markets, at least in other areas of the law. Sometimes this happens 
 
 80.  A. Paul Victor, Export Cartels: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 571, 581 
(1991). 
 81.  See D. Daniel Sokol, What Do We Really Know About Export Cartels and What is the 
Appropriate Solution?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 967, 971 (2008) (noting the lack of empirical data 
on export controls that makes non-theoretical arguments difficult); see also Martyniszyn, supra note 16, 
at 183–88. 
 82.  The fact that the exemption is automatic and export cartels need not register may make it harder 
for target countries to detect them, however. 
 83.  See infra Part V.A.  
 84.  See Martyniszyn, supra note 16, at 195–96 (discussing the difficulty developing countries have in 
regulating cartels operating abroad).  
 85.  See id. at 190–91 (discussing Thailand’s, and other developing countries’, opposition to export 
cartel exemptions).  
 86.  See Brendan Sweeney, Export Cartels: Is there a Need for Global Rules?, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 87 
(2007). 
 87.  See Guzman, supra note 68, at 1512–13. 
 88.  See, e.g., Niklas Jensen-Eriksen, A Potentially Crucial Advantage: Export Cartels as a Source of 
Power for Weak Nations, 64 REVUE ÉCONOMIQUE 1085 (2013) (chronicling Finland’s promotion of 
export control in order to grow Finnish producers).  
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as a consequence of multilateral agreements. For example, the Basel Convention 
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their 
Disposal requires states to prohibit the export of waste to countries that have 
prohibited the import of such material.89 Sometimes, this happens on the basis of 
local policies. For example, U.S. courts have long asserted jurisdiction over 
securities fraud that takes place in the United States, even if it is directed at 
foreign markets, on the grounds that the United States does not want to be a safe 
haven for fraudsters.90 Many countries criminalize sex tourism91 for similar 
reasons. A similar argument should be available for antitrust law. Developed 
countries, as promoters of competitive markets, have no legitimate interest in 
protecting anti-competitive conduct on their territory, even if the conduct only 
targets foreign markets. 
Not only the prevention of anti-competitive conduct at home, irrespective of 
the place of effects, is in the interest of the developed country. The developed 
country also has an interest in protecting competition in foreign markets. In order 
to recognize this, it is not necessary to appeal to altruism. Rather, the (seemingly) 
local good of competition on the foreign marketplace is part of a global good.92 
Foreign markets are not isolated; they are part of the global economy. Insofar as 
developed countries want the global economy to rest on competition, the 
avoidance of anti-competitive effects on foreign markets is among its genuine 
interests. Developed countries have promoted not only competition but also 
competition laws and enforcement worldwide through aid and assistance. They 
should therefore also have an interest in not providing a safe haven for 
corporations engaged in such anti-competitive conduct in foreign countries. It 
seems inconsistent to lecture a developing country on the benefits of free 
competition, and then to do nothing against one’s own corporations violating 
these principles domestically. It also is inconsistent to spend money helping a 
developing country develop its own antitrust regime and to not spend money 
preventing one’s own corporations from engaging in anti-competitive conduct in 
that country. And it seems outright cynical for a country like the United States 
to put pressure on India to dismiss an action against a United States–based export 
 
 89.  Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their 
Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 125. 
 90.  See the discussion in Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010). This was rejected 
by Justice Scalia in Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 270 (2010) (“While there is no reason 
to believe that the United States has become the Barbary Coast for those perpetrating frauds on foreign 
securities markets, some fear that it has become the Shangri–La of class-action litigation for lawyers 
representing those allegedly cheated in foreign securities markets.”). 
 91.  Naomi L. Svensson, Extraterritorial Accountability: An Assessment of the Effectiveness of Child 
Sex Tourism Laws, 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 641, 642 (2006); see also Optional Protocol on 
the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, opened for signature May 25, 2000, 2171 
U.N.T.S. 227 (entered into force Jan. 18, 2002). See also Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 34, 
opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990). 
 92.  See Eleanor Fox, Extraterritoriality in the Age of Globalization; Conflict and Comity in the Age 
of Empagran, 1 ANTITRUST REP. 1, 11–14 (2005). 
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cartel, as happened in connection with the American Soda Ash Export Cartel.93 
What is necessary is not worldwide legal harmonization, but merely the 
introduction of internal consistency into the policies of export countries. 
Notably, the interest of developed and developing country alike is that the 
cartel be regulated at all, not necessarily that it be regulated by a particular 
country. It seems proper to assume a priority for regulation in and by the target 
country of an export cartel, in accordance with the idea of subsidiarity discussed 
earlier. Insofar as such regulation takes place, exempting export cartels may be 
proper, and the export country can decide to defer under its abstention doctrines.  
Supplanting antitrust is only necessary and appropriate where such regulation in 
the target country is not possible. In that case, however, it seems weak to argue 
that regulation should be left to the developing country itself, which needs to 
establish expertise and reputation, because these are harder to develop in 
transnational than in domestic cartels. 
C. Supplanting Antitrust In Domestic Cases 
Under current conditions of global markets, relatively few cartels are purely 
local. Many cartels directly affect the markets of more than one country. 
Moreover, in a globalized economy, it is rarely the case that a cartel’s less direct 
effects remain purely local. However, domestic cartels exist, and they must be 
analyzed. What about cases in which foreign firms engage in anti-competitive 
conduct abroad and the damages occur entirely outside the United States? 
Supplanting antitrust seems mostly impossible in this case. If a cartel remains 
purely local—if the cartel members, their conduct, and the affected market are 
all in one country—then that country is, under international law, the only one 
entitled to regulate the conduct.94 The United States, for example, would 
normally have no jurisdiction over a cartel that remains within the borders of El 
Salvador. If El Salvador has no antitrust regime, the cartel remains unregulated. 
This reality has contributed to the strong push to help countries, especially 
developing countries, build their own antitrust regimes.95 
Does this change if the country is incapable of taking on a cartel on its own? 
Could a developed country regulate here as well? Developed countries are 
interested in competitive conditions in foreign markets. This is why they provide 
technical and financial assistance to developing countries. They might, therefore, 
also be interested in regulating domestic cartels in foreign countries as a form of 
nonmonetary assistance. 
As long as the developing country does not request enforcement, however, 
developed countries cannot use their own institutions to regulate the foreign  
 
 
 93.  See Martyniszyn, supra note 16, at 202–03 (describing how the United States pressured India 
and India acquiesced).  
 94.  Supra Part III.B. 
 95.  See Aydin & Büthe, supra note 13, at 28–29 (discussing importance of international efforts in 
encouraging new competition regimes). 
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market. Foreign regulation of another country’s internal affairs is an illegal 
interference with the regulated country’s sovereignty.96 
Only where the developed country explicitly requests enforcement could the 
lack of jurisdiction be remedied through the principle of representation.97 Even 
then, however, regulation of domestic cartels is in most cases undesirable. In 
domestic cases, the most desirable situation is one in which the affected country 
itself regulates. The long-term interest, of both developed and developing 
countries, is for developing countries to build the necessary institutions and 
expertise.  If the country lacks institutions, then domestic cartels are the core 
cases on which domestic authorities can develop expertise and reputation. 
Developed countries should render all assistance necessary for effective 
regulation, but should generally not use their own enforcement mechanisms for 
foreign cases with purely domestic effects. 
V 
OBJECTIONS 
Although supplanting antitrust is sometimes justified, there are bound to be 
objections. In fact, the idea seems unattractive to a range of different groups. 
Libertarians may fear the idea of regulatory meddling in export markets. 
Proponents of development may fear the undermining of indigenous law reform 
projects. Progressives may fear U.S. hegemonialism. Sovereigntists may worry 
about the use of U.S. resources for foreign market concerns. There is some value 
to each of these objections, but none of them hold up. 
A. Neocolonialism/Hegemonialism 
A first objection arises from sovereignty, including economic sovereignty. 
Politically, sovereignty entails mastery of one’s own markets. It would be 
hegemonialist, even neocolonialist, for a developed country to take over 
regulation of an underdeveloped country’s markets. Supplanting antitrust may 
smack like a negation of independence. A developed country making and 
enforcing economic policies for an underdeveloped country sounds like 
neocolonialism. Further, the idea that a developed country’s agencies expand 
their reach has a hegemonialist ring to it. 
These concerns must be taken seriously, but they can be answered and at least 
some of the expected problems can be avoided. Western hegemonialism today 
consists not only, or not even primarily, of the expansion of Western laws—it 
consists of the expansion of Western economic power. This is clearest where 
Western corporations are engaged in anti-competitive conduct. In this case, an 
expansion of Western law is not hegemonialist in itself; it merely follows the 
expansion of such economic power. In offering their laws to those injured by the 
 
 96.  RYNGAERT, supra note 42, at 5–6. 
 97.  REYDAMS, supra note 41, at 21–24. 
MICHAELS  (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2016  1:03 PM 
No. 4 2016] SUPPLANTING FOREIGN ANTITRUST 243 
conduct of their corporations, developed countries are not primarily 
hegemonialist—they largely re-establish the balance between economic freedom 
for corporations and protection of consumers that are taken for granted in those 
countries themselves.98 If anything, it is hegemonialist to allow corporations to 
raid foreign markets and not offer recourse in those corporations’ home courts. 
The fact that developing countries often do not object to such regulation by 
institutions in developed countries may be a sign that they approve. Indeed, 
foreign countries are often even themselves plaintiffs in U.S. courts.99 
Supplanting antitrust could still be viewed as neocolonialist in a broader 
sense. Technical assistance, for example, is not purely innocent and altruistic. 
Experts from developed countries may also attempt to influence opinions and 
actions in less developed countries in order to open those markets for 
corporations from developed countries. Legal transplants are ways to enhance 
access for lawyers from developed countries. However, an important difference 
exists between neocolonialism and supplanting antitrust. Neocolonialism, like 
colonialism, depicts a situation in which a developed country exploits an 
underdeveloped country for its own benefit. Supplanting antitrust, by contrast, 
depicts a situation in which a developed country helps an underdeveloped 
country succeed. Of course, whether these conditions are met is easier said in 
theory than found in practice, and much will depend here on the factors described 
earlier. 
B. Lack Of Interest 
If the first problem was one in which the developed country inserts too much 
of its own interests into the supplanting, the opposite problem is that the 
developed country may have no such interest at all. Lack of interest can be a 
problem of resources. Antitrust agencies in developed countries have limited 
resources and may not want to spend those on activities that do not benefit their 
markets. However, the agencies have other interests. Not only do regulating 
countries often make money from regulation—directly through fines, or 
indirectly through lawyers’ fees.100 Moreover, developed countries are already 
investing resources into foreign antitrust regimes in the form of technical 
 
 98.  See Ralf Michaels, Empagran’s Empire: International Law and Statutory Interpretation in the 
U.S. Supreme Court of the Twenty-First Century, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 533 (David L. Sloss et al. eds., 2011) (discussing how the Supreme 
Court’s decision that foreign purchasers could not use U.S. antitrust law is hegemonialist).  
 99.  For an analysis of cases, see Hannah L. Buxbaum, Foreign Governments as Plaintiffs in U.S. 
Courts and the Case Against “Judicial Imperialism”, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 653 (2016). Even 
developed countries bring suits in U.S. courts. See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 
(2016); Stéphanie Francq, Agora: Reflections on RJR Nabisco v. European Community: A European 
Story, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 74 (2016) (discussing motivation for the EU to sue in US courts); 
see also Anthony J. Colangelo, Agora: Reflections on RJR Nabisco v. European Community: The 
Frankenstein’s Monster of Extraterritoriality Law, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 51, 55 (2016) (arguing 
that refusal to open courts to foreign sovereign plaintiffs undermines, rather than protects, foreign 
relations interests). 
 100.  This assumes that fines contribute to the developing country’s economy. 
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assistance. Underlying both development aid and substitution is a common idea 
that helping global markets is a genuine interest of developed countries.  
Levenstein and Suslow suggest that, conservatively estimated, the illegitimate 
gains made by multinational and transnational cartels from developing countries 
amount to about 15% of development aid.101 Regulating such cartels is thus a way 
to reduce the need for development aid. 
C. Lack Of Expertise 
A third problem concerns lack of country-specific expertise. Agencies in 
developed economies have significant expertise in markets and anti-competitive 
conduct, but that expertise is focused on their own markets. U.S. enforcers are 
used to protecting the interests of U.S. consumers. It may be hard for them to 
adjust their framework to a very different economy in a developing country. 
This is a real problem for supplanting antitrust. It could be remedied by 
developing a more cosmopolitan perspective on matters of antitrust law. Given 
the rise of trans- and multinational cartels, such development will be required 
from antitrust enforcers in the developed world anyway. But it is a long way to 
get there, and whether U.S. authorities are at present capable of taking the 
specificities of foreign economies into account is an open question. To some 
extent, including experts from (and on) the developing country in the 
decisionmaking may remedy this problem. It is not certain that such expertise can 
effectively be provided by experts from the affected market, if only because U.S. 
authorities often lack the necessary expertise in listening to foreign experts. To 
some extent, the problem may be unavoidable, but regulation with the wrong 
kind of expertise may still be preferable to no regulation at all. 
Finally, in some cases, it may help to use Gal’s Recognition-of-Judgments 
Mechanism and leave the determination of country-specific considerations to the 
enforcement in that country.102 Indeed, her solution is in important ways similar 
to the concept of supplanting developed here: findings and decisions are made in 
the developed country and then applied to the developing country. In one way, 
such a recognition mechanism presents an advantage over the idea of 
supplanting, because it retains the sovereign discretion of the institutions in the 
developing country and thus leaves much to their expertise.103 In another way, it 
presents a potential disadvantage, because it does not require the institutions in 
the developed country to take these institutions into account. While it does 
present efficiency gains, it does not overcome the intrinsic problem of regulating 
global markets on a state-by-state basis. Further, her proposal will work only for 
developing countries that have functioning regimes and private suits. All of this 
may mean that sometimes the enforcement solution will not yield better results. 
Nonetheless, both ideas can be seen as complementary rather than mutually 
exclusive. 
 
 101.  Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 11, at 813, 816. 
 102.  See Gal, supra note 28, at 59 (proposing the idea of the Recognition-of-Judgments Mechanism).  
 103.  Id. at 76–78. Sovereignty implications of the proposal are discussed infra Part V.D. 
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D. The Problem Of Fit 
Another possible objection is that the antitrust law of a developed country 
might not be adequate for the regulation of developing economies because they 
need different antitrust regimes.104 This is a sensible objection, but it does not 
provide a compelling counterargument for three reasons. 
The most important of the three has to do with the character of the regulated 
cartels. The argument in this article is not that the law of the developed country 
should be used for all antitrust regulation. Insofar as it is possible for a developing 
country in a global economy to develop its own idiosyncratic regime and apply it 
effectively, this must certainly be possible and it may even be desirable. This is 
the case for domestic cartels. However, multinational and transnational cartels 
affect multiple markets. Regulating them with a patchwork of idiosyncratic 
regimes does not necessarily do them justice. 
An additional argument follows from the theory of second best.105 Local and 
idiosyncratic effective antitrust regimes might be optimal in a hypothetical world. 
But they are not an alternative when they either do not exist or they are not 
effective enough to take on strong international cartels. Even if—especially if—
the goal is to help developing countries build idiosyncratic antitrust regimes, 
these countries should not be expected to use their limited resources to take on 
big international cartels. Instead, they should be liberated from regulating 
international cartels that would simply be too big for them. 
A way to create a better fit would be for the authorities of the developing 
countries to apply the law of the developing country. Application of foreign law 
alone does not lead to a perfect fit, because there is no guarantee that the foreign 
law is applied in the exact same way as it would by the foreign country. But, it 
would be a partial response. Under current law, such application of foreign 
antitrust law is all but ruled out.106 The idea of supplanting antitrust provides a 
new reason to rethink this restriction. 
Still, one part of the critique remains unanswered. Developing countries may 
fear that the imposition of a developed country’s antitrust laws, even if restricted 
to international cartels, is not aligned with these countries’ own economic 
interests. Even if, as argued above, local regulation is not, for the time being, a 
workable alternative, the problem remains that these economic interests can be 
underappreciated. It is only a partial answer to such concerns to require the 
developed country’s regulatory authorities to take the interests of developing 
countries into account.107 This means that they should look at market conditions 
in these countries. It also means that they should confer with the countries 
themselves, in order to determine the optimal regulation policy vis-à-vis the 
international cartel. Such proposals may, to some extent, remain wishful thinking. 
 
 104.  Supra Part III.E.  
 105.  R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 
(1956). 
 106.  Supra Part III.C. 
 107.  FOX, supra note 21. 
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First, authorities in developed countries often lack the necessary expertise 
concerning foreign markets. Second, these authorities may be especially averse 
to taking into account foreign regulatory ideals that are in conflict not just with 
their own ideals but also with their country’s economic interests. As conditions 
stand today, idiosyncratic regulatory ideals of developing countries may not find 
the attention that they deserve. 
E. Local Institution Building 
A final objection concerns the building of local antitrust institutions. Where 
a developed country takes over regulation of a transboundary cartel, the affected 
developed country has limited opportunity to develop expertise, nor does it have 
an incentive do so. In order to enable developing countries to develop expertise, 
so the objection goes, regulation of their local markets must be left to them. 
It is true that institutions in developing countries must develop their own 
expertise, and supplanting antitrust is subsidiary to achieving this goal. However, 
it is doubtful that expertise is best learned in big transboundary cases that the 
institutions cannot yet handle by themselves. Contrariwise, if such cases are 
regulated by a developed country, the developing country has a chance to 
dedicate its resources to the domestic cases it can handle—and thereby, in the 
long run, develop the expertise to regulate also bigger transboundary cases. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
The best solution for developing countries remains the establishment of 
effective antitrust regimes. The best solution for global markets would be, in all 
likelihood, an effective and legitimate global antitrust regime, with sufficient 
sensitivity for local and economic differences. An ideal world would have both. 
This article is not concerned with this ideal world, or ways to get closer to it. 
Instead, it is concerned with what should be done until we get there. 
This article has argued that under certain circumstances it may be both 
justifiable and desirable—for developed and developing countries alike—for the 
institutions of a developed country to supplant the antitrust regime of a 
developing country incapable of dealing with the concrete cartel. For 
multinational cartels, this means that centralized regulation by a developed 
country is often desirable. Multinational cartels can be regulated more efficiently 
if regulation stays with one centralized country. Multinational cartels can only be 
regulated effectively when the regulator takes into account the effects of the 
conduct on countries without their own efficient regulation. Likewise, cartels 
with effects only on a developing country are sometimes best regulated by a 
developed country. This is so when the developed country has a jurisdictional 
basis and a genuine interest, most notably in the case of export cartels. However 
this is not the case when the cartel is purely local to the developed country. 
Supplanting antitrust raises further concrete implications that have not been 
discussed. The article does not discuss distinctions between public and private 
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enforcement of antitrust laws. It does not discuss the complex evidence-gathering 
mechanisms that would be required. It does not discuss whether leniency should 
be given also to whistleblowers in foreign markets. It does not discuss problems 
of public choice. In all of these regards, further work would be needed. Hopefully, 
the article suggests that this work would be worthwhile. 
In all likelihood supplanting will remain rare. Even in the cases in which it 
would be justified, developed countries will often fear the expenses, the effects 
on their own industries, and the international relations complications with other 
developed countries if their industries are subject to the regulation. This makes 
it easier for developed countries to rely on territoriality and defer to the 
hypothetical sovereign decisions of developing countries on how to regulate their 
own markets, even when the markets are global and the developing countries 
lack the capacities to make such a meaningful choice. If this article has made such 
an argument a little harder to make, it has already achieved an important goal. 
 
